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Summary
We consider the problem of combining k subjective probability distributions for
a quantity of interest θ ∈ Θ. Two modiﬁed versions of the irrelevance of alter-
natives axiom are introduced by focusing on the consensual conditional odds,
rather than the consensual probabilities. A strong modiﬁcation of the axiom re-
quires that the consensual odds depend only on the individual odds, while a weak
modiﬁcation requires that the consensual odds depend exclusively on the prob-
abilities assigned by the experts to the two events being considered. We show
that, provided some regularity conditions, the stronlgy modiﬁed axiom leads to
characterization of the Logarithmic Opinion Pool. We also characterize the class
of all the pools satisfying the weakly modiﬁed axiom. This class contains not only
the Linear and the Logarithmic Pools but also pools that have been considered
previously in the literature without axiomatic justiﬁcations.
Key words: Consensus; expert opinions; irrelevance of alternatives; linear opin-
ion pool; logarithmic opinion pool.
1 Introduction
Suppose that k experts express their opinions about a quantity or param-
eter θ ∈ Θ through probability distributions p1,...,pk. Often either an
external decision maker or the group as a whole may want to summarize
these opinions into a unique probability function p⋆, called the consensual
distribution (French, 1985). For instance, the decision maker or the group
may want to make a decision involving the uncertain θ, and p⋆ would then
be used as the prior distribution in a Bayesian formulation of the problem.
Without further structure, the problem can be stated as the choice of a
“reasonable” or convenient operator T : Pk → P, where P is the set of
probability distributions with support Θ and p⋆ = T(p1,...,pk). [Here
we assume that disagreements about the support of p⋆ have been already
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settled, or equivalently that the experts use Lindley’s (1985a) Cromwell’s
rule, and so each pi and p⋆ have support Θ.] T is usually called an opinion
pool.
We will consider here the case where Θ is ﬁnite, without loss of gener-
ality Θ = Is = {1,...,s}. Notwithstanding, most of the matters discussed
here should also hold, but for minor modiﬁcations, in the case of more
general Θ. With the assumption of ﬁnite Θ, each pi can be represented
as a vector in the s-dimensional simplex with strictly positive components,
pi = (pi(1),...,pi(s)), where pi(j) = pi({j}) > 0 and
Ps
j=1 pi(j) = 1,
1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ s. Similarly we denote p⋆ = (p⋆(1),...,p⋆(s)). We
further denote p(j) = (p1(j),...,pk(j)), the probabilities assigned to the
event {j} by the k experts.
An approach which has been often treated in the literature is based on
obtaining characterizations of some families of opinion pools from appar-
ently weak assumptions about the behavior of T. The following property
[introduced by Lehrer and Wagner (1981)],
Irrelevance of Alternatives (IA): For any j ∈ Is, T(p1,...,pk)(j)
depends on p1,...,pk only through p(j) = (p1(j),...,pk(j)),
together with some mild regularity conditions (for instance some kind of
unanimity preservation axiom), can be shown to imply the so called class
of Linear Opinion Pools (LinOP’s):
T(p1,...,pk)(j) =
k X
i=1
wipi(j) , (1.1)
where the wi’s are nonnegative weights summing one [see Lehrer and Wag-
ner (1981) and McConway (1981)]. A modiﬁcation of this property may
be formulated by focusing on ratios of probabilities rather than the prob-
abilities themselves:
Strongly Modiﬁed Irrelevance of Alternatives (SMIA):
For any two j, j′ in Is, the ratio T(p1,...,pk)(j)/ T(p1,...,pk)(j′)
depends on p1,...,pk only through the k ratios p1(j)/p1(j′),...,
pk(j)//pk(j′).
This SMIA is closely related to Genest, Weerahandi and Zidek’s (1984)
Relative Propensity Consistency, and actually it follows as a corollary to
their results that SMIA leads, again together with mild regularity condi-
tions (for instance requiring that T is Lebesgue measurable) to the class of
Logarithmic Opinion Pools (LogOP’s):
T(p1,...,pk)(j) =
Qk
i=1[pi(j)]wi
Ps
j=1
Qk
i=1[pi(j)]wi
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Recently Pennock and Wellman (2000) have suggested using LogOP’s in
order to combine probabilities expressed through a graphical model, since
in this case the LogOP’s would maintain commonly held Markov indepen-
dencies in this situation.
Since the classes of LinOP’s and LogOP’s are relatively small when
compared to the class of all opinion pools, the results referred to above may
be seen as providing strong characterizations based on weak assumptions.
This fact, which should not be surprising to those familiar with functional
equations type arguments, may suggest that the assumptions are not as
weak as they seem to be. Thus, it seems worthwhile to study the eﬀect
that relaxing these axioms would have on the previous characterizations.
In this paper we consider the following
Weakly Modiﬁed Irrelevance of Alternatives (WMIA):
For any two j, j′ ∈ Is, the ratio T(p1,...,pk)(j)/ T(p1,...,pk)(j′)
depends on p1,...,pk only through p(j) = (p1(j),...,pk(j))
and p(j′) = (p1(j′),...,pk(j′)),
and show that it characterizes pools of the form
T(p1,...,pk)(j) =
τj(p1(j),...,pk(j))
Ps
j=1 τj(p1(j),...,pk(j))
, (1.3)
where τ1,...,τs are arbitrary functions from (0,1)k into (0,∞). If we
further assume that the pooling process commutes with permutations of
the elements of Θ:
Weak Label Neutrality (with respect to the parameter space)
(WLN): if a = (a1,...,as) is a permutation of {1,...,s}, and
pi, p
(a)
i are such that p
(a)
i (j) = pi(aj), 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ s;
then T(p
(a)
1 ,...,p
(a)
k )(j) = T(p1,...,pk)(aj),
then it is shown in Section 3 that
T(p1,...,pk)(j) =
τ(p1(j),...,pk(j))
Ps
j=1 τ(p1(j),...,pk(j))
(1.4)
for some τ : (0,1)k → (0,∞).
As well as IA, WLN was considered by Lehrer and Wagner (1981).
It states that the pooling should not give any preferential treatment to
certain values of θ. WMIA is both weaker than and a weak modiﬁcation
of both the IA and the SMIA principles. Consequently, the class (1.4)
contains both the LinOP’s and the LogOP’s, although it is much broader
than any of these classes. Opinion pools of the form (1.3) and (1.4) have
been considered previously in the literature [see for instance Genest (1984),
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without any axiomatic justiﬁcation. Genest (1984) regards (1.4) to be
similar to a likelihood principle. The extent of such similarity is made
clear by our results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
introduce some additional notation, discuss the concept of (conditional)
consensual odds, which will be crucial in the formulation of the problem,
and discuss the IA, SMIA and WMIA properties in the context of a par-
ticular example. Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 characterizing the opinion pools
(1.3) and (1.4) are stated and proved in Section 3. We also show in that
Section an alternative proof of the fact that SMIA together with WLN and
regularity conditions imply the LogOP. [This result is essentially due to
Genest, Weerahandiand Zidek (1984), see their comment at the end of page
65.] A brief summary and discussion is presented in Section 4. Finally, to
avoid disrupting the argument, the proof of a technical lemma needed in
the proof of Proposition 3.2 is delayed to an appendix.
2 Preliminary considerations
If x = (x1,...,xk) and y = (y1,...,yk) are in (0,1)k, we denote x < y if
xi < yi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Given a probability function p = (p(1),...,p(s)) with support Θ, we
deﬁne the associated conditional odds Op : I2
s → (0,∞) by Op(j,j′) =
p(j)/p(j′). For the sake of notation we will denote Opi = Oi, and similarly
Op⋆ = O⋆ = T(p1,...,pk)(j)/ T(p1,...,pk)(j′). Formally, O⋆(j,j′) is the
consensual odds on {θ = j} conditional on the event that θ ∈ {j,j′}. It
is straightforward to check that O⋆(j,j′) = [O⋆(j′,j)]−1 and O⋆(j,j′′) =
O⋆(j,j′) O⋆(j′,j′′). Although there are s2 pairs (j,j′), knowledge of con-
veniently chosen s − 1 values of O⋆ is enough to recover p⋆. For instance,
it is easily checked that
T(p1,...,pk)(j) = [1 +
X
j′ =j
O⋆(j′,j)]−1 .
Many examples of the use of odds or ratios of probabilities, rather
than the probabilities themselves, when modeling experts’ opinions, can be
found in the literature. A non comprehensive list includes Bordley (1982),
Aczel and Saaty (1983) and Genest, Weerahandi and Zidek (1984). In a
diﬀerent approach to opinion pooling, the model of Lindley, (1985b) can be
shown to be equivalent to modeling of the quantities Oi(j,s) and O⋆(j,s)
for j = 1,2,...,s − 1. The SMIA property can be restated in terms of
odds: O⋆(j,j′) should depend only on the k Oi(j,j′)’s, which is equivalent
to a straight irrelevance of alternatives property expressed in terms of odds
rather than probabilities. Consequently one would expect that the LogOP,
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pool in terms of a convenient transformation of the odds. That this is the
case is easily checked for (1.2) is equivalent to
logO⋆(j,j′) =
X
i
wi logOi(j,j′) . (2.1)
Incidentally, observe that one could deﬁne an opinion pool through this last
equation with j′ ﬁxed, and then the LogOP (1.2) follows, no matter which
j′ we choose. This is an important property of the log transformation in
this context, which is not shared by other transformations. (For instance,
if we ﬁx j′ and deﬁne an opinion pool through the relationship O⋆(j,j′) = P
i wiOi(j,j′), then in general we would have diﬀerent pools for diﬀerent
choices of j′.)
The following example will help to clarify the IA, SMIA and WMIA
properties.
Example 2.1 Consider two hypothetical cases whereby the same two ex-
perts assign probabilities on Θ = {1,...,5}. Let p1 and p2 be the prob-
abilities assigned in the ﬁrst case and similarly q1 and q2 for the second
case. These are shown in Table 1 together with the consensual probabili-
ties for three pools: a LinOP T1, a LogOP T2 and a pool T3 of the form
(1.3), where τj(u1,u2) = τ(u1,u2) = φ(w1φ−1(u1) + w2φ−1(u2)) and φ is
the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In all three cases
we considered equal weights w1 = w2 = 0.5.
Note that although in both cases the experts assign the same probabil-
ities to the event {j = 1} (i.e. p(1) = q(1)), we have that T2(1) . = 0.072
for Case 1 while T2(1) . = 0.083 for Case 2. Hence, the LogOP T2 does
not satisfy the IA property. The same argument shows that neither does
T3. Note however that T1(1) . = 0.075 is the same for both cases, since
the LinOP satisﬁes IA. Similarly, although the odds for {j = 3} against
{j = 2} are the same (i.e. p(3)/p(2) = q(3)/q(2) = (2,1), where the ratios
are taken component-wise), we have that T3(3)/T3(2) . = 1.434 for Case 1
while T3(3)/T3(2) . = 1.535 for Case 2. Therefore, T3 does not satisfy SMIA,
and neither does T1. On the contrary, for T2 the corresponding ratios are
the same for both cases, and in fact we will show in Proposition 3.4 that T2
satisﬁes SMIA. Finally, in both cases the experts assign the same probabil-
ities to the events {j = 4} and {j = 1} (i.e. p(4) = q(4) and p(1) = q(1)),
and for any of the three pools we have that the ratios T(4)/T(1) are equal
for Case 1 and for Case 2. Proposition 3.2 will show that all three of them
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Table 1
Assigned and consensual probabilities for Example 2.1.
Case 1
j
1 2 3 4 5
p1 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.60
p2 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.70
T1 0.075 0.050 0.075 0.150 0.650
T2 0.072 0.051 0.072 0.144 0.661
T3 0.072 0.051 0.072 0.146 0.658
Case 2
j
1 2 3 4 5
q1 0.05 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.15
q2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.60
T1 0.075 0.150 0.250 0.150 0.375
T2 0.083 0.166 0.234 0.166 0.351
T3 0.077 0.155 0.238 0.155 0.374
3 Main results
When s ≤ 3 any opinion pool would trivially satisfy WMIA, so we assume
in what follows that s ≥ 4.
There is a simple argument which suggest that any pool that satisﬁes
WMIA should be of the form (1.3). Let I
(2)
s = {(j,j′) ∈ I2
s : j  = j′},
and D = {(x,y;j,j′) ∈ (0,1)k × (0,1)k × I
(2)
s : x + y < 1}. WMIA
implies that there exists a function f : D → (0,∞) such that O⋆(j,j′) =
f(p(j),p(j′);j,j′). From our discussion about O⋆, f should satisfy that
f(x,y;j,j′) = [f(y,x;j′,j)]−1 (3.1)
and
f(x,y;j,j′) = f(x,z;j,j′′)f(z,y;j′′,j′) (3.2)
whenever (x,y;j,j′), (x,z;j,j′′) and (z,y;j′′,j) ∈ D and x + y + z < 1.
Now, ﬁx p(1) = y ∈ (0,1)k and deﬁne f(x,x;j,j) = 1. We have that
T(p1,...,pk)(j) = [1 +
X
j′ =j
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= [
X
j′
f(p(j′),y;j′,1)f(y,p(j);1,j)]−1 =
f(p(j),y;j,1)
P
j′ f(p(j′),y;j′,1)
, (3.3)
which is of the form (1.3) with τj(x) = f(x,y;j,1). This argument would
work just ﬁne but for the fact that since it is based on (3.1) and (3.2),
equation (3.3) as stated works only for p(j)+p(j′)+y < 1. The following
proposition shows that f can be extended from D into D⋆ = (0,1)k ×
(0,1)k × I2
s, correcting this problem. Its proof is left for the appendix.
Proposition 3.1 Let s ≥ 4 and f : D → (0,∞) satisfy (3.1) and (3.2)
whenever (x,y;j,j′), (x,z;j,j′′) and (z,y;j′′,j) ∈ D and x + y + z < 1.
Then, there exists a unique extension f⋆ : D⋆ → (0,∞) such that f⋆ = f
on D and f⋆ satisﬁes (3.1) and (3.2) whenever its arguments are in D⋆.
Proposition 3.2 Let s ≥ 4. Then an opinion pool T satisﬁes WMIA if
and only if it is of the form (1.3).
Proof: Suﬃciency follows from direct substitution. Necessity follows from
the previous argument, more precisely from equation (3.3) with f substi-
tuted by f⋆ and τj(x) = f⋆(x,y;j,1) for some y ∈ (0,1)k ﬁxed.
If we add WLN to the hypotheses in Proposition 3.2, it seems clear
that the functions τj should be independent of j.
Proposition 3.3 Let s ≥ 4. Then an opinion pool T satisﬁes WMIA and
WLN if and only if it is of the form (1.4).
Proof: Again suﬃciency follows from direct substitution. To prove ne-
cessity, we know from Proposition 3.2 that T must be of the form (1.3).
Now, given any x ∈ (0,1)k and j ∈ Is, consider p1,...,pk ∈ P such that
p(1) = x, and a permutation a given by a1 = j, aj = 1 and ah = h for
h  = 1,j. For j′  = 1,j, WLN implies that
τj(x)
τj′(p(j′))
= O⋆(j,j′) = O⋆(aj,aj′) =
τ1(x)
τj′(p(j′))
,
so it follows that τj(x) = τ1(x). Deﬁning τ(x) = τ1(x) completes the proof.
We ﬁnish this section with an alternative proof of the fact that SMIA
together with WLN and some regularity conditions characterize the LogOP
(1.2). As was stated before, this fact follows essentially from the discussion
in Genest, Weerahandi and Zidek (1984).94 Brazilian Journal of Probability and Statistics, 16, 2002
Proposition 3.4 For s ≥ 4, let T satisfy SMIA and WLN, and supposse
aditionally that T has the properties of (i) Monotonicity, in the sense that
for p2,...,pk and p1(h) (h  = j,j′) ﬁxed, O∗(j,j′) is an increasing function
of p1(j), and (ii) Unanimity Preservation, meaning that if pi(j) = x and
pi(j′) = y (i = 1,...,k), then O∗(j,j′) = y−1x. Then T is a LogOP of the
form (1.2) with positive weights wi such that w1 +     + wk = 1.
Proof: We will prove the Proposition when k = 2. The proof for general
k follows by induction using similar arguments.
From Proposition 3.2 and the fact that SMIA implies WMIA it follows
that T must have the form (1.4). Since T satisﬁes SMIA, there must exist
a function h : (0,∞)2 → R such that
O∗(j,j′) =
τ(p1(j),p2(j))
τ(p1(j′),p2(j′))
= h(
p1(j)
p1(j′)
,
p2(j)
p2(j′)
) .
The rest of the proof will be divided in four steps.
(I) For every u,v > 0, h(u,v) = h(u,1)h(1,v):
Consider experts’ distributions p1 and p2 such that u = [p1(j′)]−1p1(j)
and v = [p2(j′)]−1p2(j). It is clear that these values can be determined
small enough so that p1(j)+p2(j′) and p2(j)+p1(j′) are both smaller than
1. Then
h(u,v) =
τ(p1(j),p2(j))
τ(p1(j′),p2(j′))
=
τ(p1(j),p2(j))
τ(p1(j′),p2(j))
τ(p1(j′),p2(j))
τ(p1(j′),p2(j′))
= h(u,1)h(1,v) .
(II) The function h∗(u) = h(u,1) satisﬁes Cauchy’s functional equation
h∗(uv) = h∗(u)h∗(v):
Given arbitrary u,v > 0, choose p1(j) = (1+u+v +uv)−1uv, p1(j′) =
(1+u+v +uv)−1 and p1(j′′) = (1+u+v +uv)−1v, and consider p2(j) =
p2(j′) = p2(j′′). Then
h∗(uv) = h(uv,1) =
τ(p1(j),p2(j))
τ(p1(j′),p2(j′))
=
τ(p1(j),p2(j))
τ(p1(j′′),p2(j′′))
τ(p1(j′′),p2(j′′))
τ(p1(j′),p2(j′))
= h∗(u)h∗(v) .
(III) Similarly, the function h∗∗(u) = h(1,u) satisﬁes that h∗∗(uv) =
h∗∗(u)h∗∗(v).
(IV) From (II) and (III) and the monotonicity condition it follows that
there must exist positive numbers w1 and w2 such that h∗(u) = uw1 and
h∗∗(v) = vw2 [see for instance Aczel (1966)]. Substituting back into h and
remembering that the LogOP can be deﬁned by (2.1) gives the pool (1.2).
Finally, the unanimity preservation condition implies that w1 + w2 = 1,
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4 Discussion
As was mentioned above, lacking further structure in the pooling problem
which would allow a more coherent combination of the experts’ opinions,
characterization theorems like the ones presented here provide help and
general guidance in the selection of an opinion pool for practical applica-
tions. At the same time, we believe that the main conclusion of this work
is that the idea of irrelevance of alternatives should be used only with an
explicit and precise statement concerning which ”alternatives” are judged
irrelevant. Both IA and SMIA are seemingly inoﬀensive, although the de-
rived characterizations of the LinOP and the LogOP show that they are
indeed quite strong. Moreover, this apparent contradiction between the
intuition behind IA or SMIA and the corresponding characterizations is
further conﬁrmed here by the fact that a supposedly minor modiﬁcation
would lead to the much broader class (1.4). Indeed, this class contains
not only the LinOP’s and LogOP’s and their generalized versions given
by Aczel, Ng and Wagner (1984) and Genest, McConway and Schervish
(1986), but also modiﬁed quasi-arithmetic averages or quasilinear opin-
ion pools (τ(p1(j),...,pk(j)) = g−1[
P
i wig(pi(j))] where g is a continuous,
strictly monotone function, see Gilardoni and Clayton (1993).
We conclude this discussion with two comments. First, it is also pos-
sible to parallel the results in Lehrer and Wagner (1981) in the following
sense: We say that T satisﬁes the weakly modiﬁed strong label neutral-
ity (WMSLN) principle if p(j) = q(h) and p(j′) = q(h′) imply that
O
p
⋆(j,j′) = O
q
⋆(h,h′), where O
p
⋆ are the consensual odds associated with
the experts’ probabilities p1,...,pk and similarly O
q
⋆. T has the strongly
modiﬁed strong label neutrality (SMSLN) if [pi(j′)]−1pi(j) = [qi(h′)]−1qi(h)
for every i implies that O
p
⋆(j,j′) = O
q
⋆(h,h′). Then it is straightforward
following the steps in Lehrer and Wagner (1981) that WMSLN is equiv-
alent to the conjunction of WMIA and WLN, while SMIA and WLN are
equivalent to SMSLN. Second, our last paragraph suggests an apparent
lack of “robustness” of the IA and SMIA principles. We admit, however,
that relaxing those principles by stating inequalities rather than strict eqi-
ualities (in the sense, say, of an IA principle that is satisﬁed up to a certain
epsilon), should be the right approach to answer that question. It should
be warned though, that functional inequalities are tipically much harder
to deal with than functional equations.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: First, we will show that f satisﬁes (3.2) even
when x + y + z > 1. Indeed, choose t0 small enough so that x + y + 3t0,
x+z+3t0 and y +z+3t0 are all smaller than 1. Then (3.2) implies that
f(x,y;j,j′) = f(x,t0;j,j′′)f(t0,y;j′′,j′) .96 Brazilian Journal of Probability and Statistics, 16, 2002
Similarly (3.1) and (3.2) imply that
f(x,z;j,j′′)f(z,y;j′′,j′) = f(x,t0;j,j′)f(t0,z;j′,j′′)f(z,t0;j′′,j)
f(t0,y;j,j′)
= f(x,t0;j,j′′)f(t0,t0;j′′,j′)f(t0,z;j′,j′′)f(z,t0;j′′,j)f(t0,t0;j,j′′)
f(t0,y;j′′,j′)
= f(x,t0;j,j′′)f(t0,t0;j′′,j′)f(t0,z;j′,j′′)f(z,t0;j′′,j′)f(t0,t0;j′,j)
f(t0,t0;j,j′)
f(t0,t0;j′,j′′)f(t0,y;j′′,j′) = f(x,t0;j,j′′)f(t0,y;j′′,j′) .
Next, for (x,y;j,j′) ∈ D∗, let z ∈ (0,1)k be such that x + z and y + z
are both smaller than 1, and j′′  = j,j′. We will deﬁne f∗(x,y;j,j′) as the
right hand side of (3.2). To complete the proof we need to show that (i)
this deﬁnition is consistent, in the sense that if z0 and j′′′ also satisfy that
x + z0 and y + z0 are both smaller than 1 and j′′′  = j,j′, then
f(x,z;j,j′′)f(z,y;j′′,j′) = f(x,z0;j,j′′′)f(z0,y;j′′′,j′) ,
(ii) f = f∗ on D, (iii) f∗ satisﬁes (3.1) and (3.2) and (iv) f∗ is the unique
function satisfying (ii) and (iii). The proof of (ii), (iii) and (iv) is, assuming
that (i) has been proved, a straightforward consequence of the deﬁnition of
f∗ and conditions (3.1) and (3.2) for f, so in order to complete the proof
we only need to show that (i) is true, i.e. that (4) holds.
First, supposse that j  = j′, and let t ∈ (0,1)k be small enough so that
x + 2t, z + 2t, y + 2t and z0 + 2t are all smaller than 1. Then
f(x,z;j,j′′)f(z,y;j′′,j′) = f(x,t;j,j′)f(t,z;j′,j′′)f(z,t;j′′,j)
f(t,y;j,j′)
= f(x,t;j,j′)f(t,z;j′,j′′)f(z,t;j′′,j′)f(t,t;j′,j)f(t,y;j,j′)
= f(x,t;j,j′)f(t,t;j′,j)f(t,y;j,j′) .
Similarly, we can show that
f(x,z0;j,j′′′)f(z0,y;j′′′,j′) = f(x,t;j,j′)f(t,t;j′,j)f(t,y;j,j′) ,
so (4) holds when j  = j′. On the other hand, if j = j′, let jiv  = j,j′′,j′′′,
and t be as before. Then
f(x,z;j,j′′)f(z,y;j′′,j) = f(x,t;j,jiv)f(t,z;jiv,j′′)f(z,t;j′′,jiv)
f(t,y;jiv,j)
= f(x,t;j,jiv)f(t,y;jiv,j) ,Gilardoni: On irrelevance of alternatives and opinion pooling 97
and similarly
f(x,z0;j,j′′′)f(z0,y;j′′′,j) = f(x,t;j,jiv)f(t,y;jiv,j) .
Therefore (4) also holds when j = j′, and the proof is completed.
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